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Globally, there is an increasing level of funding targeted to pay farmers and rural 
communities for the provision of ecosystem services, for example through Payments for 
Ecosystem or Environmental Services (PES) schemes and pilots for Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and maintaining or enhancing forest carbon 
stocks (REDD+). Therefore, there is growing interest in understanding the effects of 
economic incentives on participants’ behavior and motivations. We adopt here an 
innovative research design to test for motivational crowding effects through a forest 
conservation game in Colombia’s Amazon Piedmont, using individual, collective and 
crop-price premium economic incentives. We implement a post-experiment survey on 
different types of motivations based on Self-Determination Theory (SDT) to test for 
changes in motivations. Our findings show that all types of PES, except for the crop-price 
premium payment, increased conservation behavior in the experiment. However, not all 
types of payments affected motivations equally: collective payments enhanced social 
motivations to protect forests and the crop-price premium reduced intrinsic and 
guilt/regret related motivations. These findings contribute to disentangling the interaction 
between incentives, motivations and behaviors in a context of agricultural expansion and 











Environmental science and policy is increasingly interested in understanding if 
conservation initiatives that use direct monetary incentives to promote pro-environmental 
behaviors can unwillingly result in a “crowding-out” effect. The latter would imply either 
an alteration or substitution of intrinsic motivations to protect and sustainably manage the 
environment by extrinsic and more instrumental motivations (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 
2010; Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Pascual et al., 2010; Wunder, 2013). Understanding this 
alleged effect is relevant because increasing levels of international and national funding  
are channeled to pay farmers and communities to support pro-environmental behavior 
(e.g. Payments for Ecosystem or Services at local and global scales)1, which in turn sparks 
a growing concern over the temporal stability of such behaviors once economic incentives 
are removed (Fisher, 2012). 
 
In this article, we investigate the relationship between motivational crowding, types of 
motivations, and the specific features of a simulated scheme of Payments for Ecosystem 
or Environmental Services (PES) in Colombia’s Amazon Piedmont. PES usually involve 
the transfer of direct economic incentives to individuals and communities in exchange of 
specific or bundled ecosystem services, usually provided through sustained forest and 
biodiversity conservation activities. PES schemes emerged in the late 1990s as a policy 
tool to tackle deforestation and unsustainable resource use, and to maintain or provide 
specific ecosystem services (Engel et al., 2008), while payment conditionality was 
alleged to guarantee the provision of such services over time (Sommerville et al., 2010). 
Given their potential to involve less resource use restrictions relative to other conservation 
measures such as protected areas (Pagiola et al., 2005), PES have been widely promoted 
and implemented as an incentive for conservation in Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
(Grima et al., 2016). 
 
The largest PES schemes worldwide have been often designed and implemented by 
governments, following a subsidy-like approach that targets specific ecosystems and 
mostly rural communities, while smaller initiatives have been brokered by NGOs and 
international donors, sometimes with the backing of national or sub-national governments  
(Engel, 2016; Muradian et al., 2013; Vatn, 2010). Most PES initiatives have delivered 
direct cash payments per hectare targeted at farmers or social groups, and very few have 
rewarded providers in-kind, either individually (e.g. individual beehives or barbed wire) 
or collectively (e.g. through the improvement of public goods) (Asquith et al., 2008). 
Such diversity of PES schemes reflects the flexibility of the policy tool to adjust to 
specific contexts and needs, but it also entails analytical challenges when aiming to 
compare and assess their environmental effectiveness (Börner et al., 2017) and their 
                                                 
1 As an example, Colombia recently launched the Visión Amazonía project, which will invest US$ 200 
million (50% donated by international donors) until 2020 to halt deforestation processes completely. This 
project will be based on direct payments to landholders, and complemented by the BIOREDD+ program in 
Colombia, which aims to invest an additional US$ 27,8 million to promote sustainable livelihoods 
compatible with forest conservation.  
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contribution to human well-being (Alix-Garcia et al., 2015; Arriagada et al., 2012; Calvet-
Mir et al., 2015).  
 
People’s motivations to participate in PES have been qualitatively explored asking 
participants their reasons and perceived barriers to engage in such initiatives. In different 
countries, both instrumental (e.g. increasing household income) and non-instrumental 
reasons (e.g. maintaining forests’ non-provisioning services) have been reported as key 
participation drivers (Bremer et al., 2014; Grillos, 2017; Hendrickson & Corbera, 2015; 
Kosoy et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005). However, very few studies have addressed the 
possible effects of payments on motivations over time (Fisher, 2012). 
  
To understand such possible effects, we draw on Ryan and Deci’s (2000) Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) and build on the scarce research that has investigated 
motivational crowding in PES (Handberg & Angelsen, 2016; Kaczan et al., 2016; Midler 
et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012; Salk et al., 2016; Vollan, 2008). Most of these studies 
use controlled economic experiments to recreate real life, individual decision-making 
dilemmas. In addition, these studies have, at least implicitly, equated motivational 
crowding to changes in individuals’ behavior. However, we sustain that concluding that 
changes in behavior between experimental rounds are equivalent to motivational 
crowding is probably inaccurate, since observed behaviors in experiments may change 
after the introduction of an incentive while motivations may remain unchanged or their 
change might be lagged in time (Young, 1986). Furthermore, social psychology has noted 
that motivations and behavior might not necessarily be aligned, and it has asserted that 
although motivations precede behaviors, the former can be shaped by institutions and 
previous behaviors (Agrawal, 2005; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Schulter et al. 2017) 
 
To take into account this possible misalignment between motivations and behavior, we 
introduce in our research design a post-experiment survey to observe if different types of 
payments during an economic experiment have an impact on participants’ intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations to protect forests. The survey allows us to distinguish between 
changes in behavior and changes in different types of motivations. Furthermore, it allows 
us to attribute any changes in survey responses to participation in the experiment while 
controlling for observable variables. Therefore, we understand crowding out as any 
reduction in pro-environmental motivations across control versus treatment experimental 
groups. 
 
In what follows, we present a brief literature review on pro-environmental motivations 
and motivational crowding. Section three justifies the choice of the study site and section 
four presents our methodological approach. Section five discusses the results in the 
context of existing literature and the article concludes with a summary of findings and 






2. Literature on motivations and experimental evidence 
 
2.1 Motivational and crowding-out theories  
 
A general definition of motivation is “to be moved to do something” (R. Ryan & Deci, 
2000), and motivation is thus a driving force of human behaviour. We draw here on the 
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) as proposed by Ryan and Deci (Ryan & Deci, 1985; 
Ryan et al., 2000)2 because of its predictive power and the fact that it distinguishes across 
types of motivational processes (Moller et al., 2006). According to SDT, human 
motivation should be understood as a continuum between two extremes: intrinsic 
motivation and a-motivation. A person is intrinsically motivated to perform a task when 
such task is inherently interesting or enjoyable, while a person is a-motivated when she 
lacks an intention to act. In between, there are four types of extrinsic motivations (i.e. 
external regulation, introjection, identification and integration) that refer to doing 
something driven by external reasons (e.g. fear of punishment, avoiding the feeling of 
guilt or regret) or doing something because it leads to a separable outcome (e.g. money, 
reputation). These extrinsic motivations vary in their degree of autonomy (the 
individual’s experience of choice) and internalization of external regulations by the 
individual’s values and attitudes.  
 
SDT posits that the process of moving away from or towards intrinsic motivation is 
determined by the interaction between the external incentive and three psychological 
moderators (autonomy, feelings of competence, and relatedness). Any incentive, 
including PES, that undermines an individual’s autonomy, perceived confidence on 
reaching a goal, or her sense of belongingness to a community or social group is expected 
to crowd-out motivations, moving the individual towards the a-motivation extreme, 
driven for example by feelings of control aversion or frustration.  In contrast, any 
incentive that supports or reinforces these psychological mechanisms is expected to do 
the opposite (Ezzine-de-Blas et al., in this issue; Rode et al., 2015). 
 
General knowledge on incentives and motivational crowding comes primarily from 
psychology (Deci et al., 1999; Frey, 1994; Kahneman et al., 2011; Moller et al., 2006; R. 
Ryan et al., 1985, 2000), behavioral economics (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Gneezy 
et al., 2011; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000) and public policy literature (Ariely et al., 2009; 
Dolan et al., 2011; Le Grand, 2006; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Titmuss, 1970). A common 
reported result in this literature is a negative effect of tangible rewards on intrinsic 
motivations. In the environmental policy domain, a review of 18 articles that tested for 
motivational crowding concludes that crowding-out effects are more often reported than 
crowding-in (Rode et al., 2015). However, the authors emphasize that some of the 
reviewed articles are unclear in their use of the term “motivation”, which is often used 
interchangeably with social norms, pro-social behaviors and even emotions (e.g. guilt, 
                                                 
2 There are other theories about motivation, including e.g. the Two-Factor theory (Herzberg, 1965)the 
Expectancy value theory (Vroom, 1964)or the Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977) 
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shame). This is not a minor caveat, since contributions from environmental psychology 
suggest that these are different concepts (Steg et al., 2014). 
 
2.2 Motivations in environmental studies 
 
In environmental psychology there is a prolific debate focused on disentangling the 
relationship between attitudes, values, beliefs, motivations and pro-environmental 
behaviors in urban settings (De Groot & Steg, 2008; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Steg, 
2016; Young, 1986). Motivations are hereby understood as the reasons to engage in 
behaviors that benefit the environment (Steg et al., 2014, 2009). Different theories of pro-
environmental behavior have developed their own instruments to capture the reasons 
people have to behave in an environmentally friendly manner, being the Environmental 
Motives Scale –EMS- (Schultz, 2000) the New Ecological Paradigm Scale –NEP- 
(Dunlap et al., 2000) and the Motivation Towards the Environment Scale –MTES- 
(Pelletier et al., 1998) the most cited and used.  
 
However, as the set of pro-environmental behaviors is wide, it is no surprise that no single 
theory is broad enough to explain or predict every pro-environmental behavior (Steg et 
al., 2009). Additionally, scales are not completely exclusive and there are correlations 
between them (De Groot & Steg, 2010). Nonetheless, with different names and labels, in 
environmental psychology it is commonly accepted that pro-environmental behaviors are 
guided, in general, by reasons related to pleasure, moral duty and economic gains (Steg 
et al., 2014). 
 
In the context of environmental conservation initiatives in rural areas, some authors have 
equated motivations to the set of reasons to engage in specific activities or initiatives, 
such as community-based conservation initiatives (Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015; Souto et al., 
2014), biodiversity provision contracts (Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2016; Greiner, 2015; 
Greiner et al., 2009), PES or integrated conservation and development projects (Bremer 
et al., 2014; Fisher, 2012; Hendrickson et al., 2015; Kosoy et al., 2008; Rico García-
Amado et al., 2013), and agri-environmental schemes (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; R. L. 
Ryan et al., 2003). These studies have relied on surveys, ranking exercises or semi-
structured interviews to capture the factors and drivers of individuals’ participation, 
which can be generally classified in two sometimes overlapping categories: instrumental 
vs. non-instrumental reasons. Among instrumental reasons, economic benefits derived 
from ecosystem services or social rewards such as recognition or reputation are included. 
Non-instrumental reasons include a sense of moral duty, respect for nature and animals, 
or stewardship ethics (Rode et al., 2015). However, motivation theory guides only a 
minority of these studies (Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015) and most of them do not reflect a 
clear coherence between theory and the methods deployed. Our study addresses directly 






2.3. Experimental evidence in PES 
 
Theoretical studies caution about the potential side effects of payments on intrinsic 
motivations (Corbera et al., 2007; Sommerville et al., 2009) but few have tried to measure 
these alleged effects. This void might relate to the fact that in order to examine whether 
PES crowd out other values one should ideally employ a longitudinal research design and 
be able to to determine causality of outcomes (Fisher, 2012 p.45). To date, two 
methodological approaches have been employed to address this challenge: quasi-
experimental evidence and economic experiments. Grounded on quasi-experimental 
evidence, Agrawal et al. (2015) find that crowding out of motivations has occurred when 
participants of an environmental and development project in the Himalayas received 
private economic incentives while crowding in happened when participants received 
communal assets or collective benefits. In Cambodia, Chervier et al., (2017) show that 
PES participants report more money related reasons to protect forests and are more likely 
to break conservation rules after payments cease compared to a control group.  
 
Studies using decision-making experiments to test for motivational crowding have been 
often structured around two stages: a first stage that sets the behavioral baseline, i.e. 
recreating a situation in which no communitarian, governmental or market regulatory 
mechanisms are implemented to manage forests, and a second stage in which an incentive 
or regulation is introduced to allow for a comparison of individuals’ behavior between 
phases 1 and 2. Crowding-in happens when the desired environmental behavior in phase 
2 (with incentives) is higher than in phase 1 (without incentives), while crowding-out 
occurs when the opposite is observed. However, as noted earlier, the problem of this 
approach is to implicitly equate changes in behaviors to changes in motivations, which is 
problematic given that observed behaviors may change in the experiment but motivations 
may remain unchanged, or their change might be lagged in time. Hence, the durability of 
observed behaviors depends on the motivations operating behind (McClelland & Canter, 
1981; Moller et al., 2006; Young, 1993). 
 
Four out of six experimental studies identified find no support for the behavioral 
crowding-out hypothesis (Handberg et al., 2016; Kaczan et al., 2016; Salk et al., 2016; 
Vollan, 2008) while the other two (Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012) conclude that 
crowding-out occurs when collective payments are implemented and crowding-in when 
payments are granted individually (Table 1). Only two of these five studies have added a 
third stage in which the incentive is removed to test the persistent effects of the incentive 
(Kaczan et al., 2016; Salk et al., 2016). These studies have been developed in very 
different institutional contexts, using distinct types of experiments and lack a baseline of 
motivations, which limit their ability to generalize about both behavioral and motivational 
crowding in PES. By combining an economic experiment with a motivations-focused 
survey, our study thus aims to analyze separately motivations and behaviors and provide 
a more nuanced analysis of the interaction between motivations and behaviors under 




Table 1. A review of experimental economics and quasi-experimental studies measuring 
motivational crowding.  
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Study Country Method Crowd out  Crowd in 
1. Vollan (2008) 
South Africa and 
Namibia  
Experimental Economics: Common Pool 
Resources game-Penalty vs payment/ 
Controlling vs. Supportive intervention 
High vs low self-determination/ trust and 
social norms 
No evidence  No evidence 
2. Agrawal, Chhatre and 
Gerber (2015) India 
Quasi-experimental 
Before and after 




When participants received 
communal assets or 
collective benefits  
3. Narloch et al. (2012); 
Midler et al.  (2015) 
Perú and Bolivia 
Experimental economics: agro biodiversity 
game- public goods game with threshold- 
individual and collective payments w/wo 
communication  
Collective payments 
crowd out social norms 
Individual payments crowd 
in social norms 




Matching with non-participants 
Participants reported 
more money related 
reasons to protect forests 
and were more likely to 
rule breaking after 
payments cease 
No evidence 
5. Handberg and Angelsen 
(2017) Tanzania 
Experimental economics  
0%, 20%, 60% and 100% PES  in a public 
goods game 
No evidence No evidence 
6. Kaczan, Swallow and 
Adamowicz (2016) 
Tanzania 
Experimental economics: Dictator game-
Individual vs. collective payment 
low and high mandated levels of 
contribution, backed by penalties  
No evidence No evidence 
7. Salk, López and Wong 
(2017)  
Lao PDR 
Experimental economics: Common pool 
resources game 
Individual, collective and insurance 
payments  
No evidence after 
incentive removal 




3. Case study and methods 
 
3.1. El Caraño in Caquetá 
 
This research was conducted in the corregimiento3 of El Caraño, municipality of 
Florencia, department of Caquetá, south-west Colombia (Figure 1). El Caraño sits within 
the Amazon Piedmont, an ecological transition zone characterized by high rates of 
biodiversity and deforestation and laying between the Andes and the tropical Amazon 
rainforest. Two of the main tributaries of the Amazon river, the Caquetá and the 
Putumayo rivers, start in the Amazon Piedmont. 
 
Deforestation in Caquetá was the highest of Colombia in 2015, with 23.812 hectares lost 
(IDEAM, 2016) as a result of expanding agricultural and cattle rearing activities. 18.7% 
of the remaining forests in El Caraño are highly vulnerable to deforestation because they 
can be easily reached by road, which facilitates the advancement of the agricultural 
frontier, and the development of illegal logging, mining exploration and charcoal making 
activities (Vélez et al., 2016). Not surprisingly then, several public, private, and 
multilateral conservation initiatives have targeted or plan to operate in Caquetá. The 
department is one of the selected strategic zones for piloting the 2017 National PES 
programme and it is one of the districts where the national NGO Patrimonio Natural (PN) 
plans to design and start the implementation of a PES scheme within the next few years. 
This research is part of a scoping study to support PN in the design of such PES scheme.  
 
Our study involved participants from 13 rural districts in El Caraño, where land tenure is 
mostly informal: 65% of research participants do not hold any legal land title but claim 
possession of their farmed and forest plots. Plots are located either inside the National 
Forest Reserve of the Amazonia- public lands- or are legally owned by large private 
landholders. Settlements in the area are the product of violent conflict in other regions 
that forced families to re-locate. This settlement pattern is important because many of the 
inhabitants are officially considered colonos who cleared the forest to plant subsistence 
crops (Vázques- Delgado, 2015). The median farm size of the research participants is 15 
hectares and approximately 5% of plot size is allocated to coffee cultivation, which is the 
main cash crop in Caquetá, alongside sugarcane (6.2%) and profitable cattle rearing.  
  
                                                 








Source: cartographic data from Digital Chart of the World, GDAM, SO HYBAM and IGAC 2014. 
 
Forests cover 50% of the research participants’ plots on average, while the rest is 
allocated to farming and cattle. Material conditions vary greatly: some farmers have 
extremely precarious living conditions (e.g. very low income and no kitchen or toilet in 
their house) while others are above the municipality average condition (e.g. a well-
equipped house and various productive assets). Average household size is 4 people and 
families arrived approximately 11 years ago to El Caraño, with some settiling more than 




To explore the effects of PES on farmers’ motivations we relied on two research 
instruments: a framed field economic experiment and a post-experiment survey. We also 
conducted a preliminary fieldwork process that included a series of interviews (n=7), 
workshops with community members (n=52), and deploying a pilot questionnaire in 
seven rural districts of El Caraño to test the motivation survey and to gather key socio-
demographic, productive and environmental knowledge data (n=100). Between the 5th 
and the 10th of September 2016, 257 farmers participated in an experimental economics 
game and responded to a motivations-related survey after the experiment4.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to control and treatment groups. Participants in the 
control groups (CGs) participated in a game without any PES involved, and participants 
                                                 
4 They were also invited to a socialization workshop to discuss research results in September 10 th 2016, 
which was attended by 85 research participants.  
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in the treatment groups (TGs) played a game with one out of four possible payment types. 
Our test of motivational crowding is based on the comparison of post-experiment survey 
responses between CGs and TGs following a between group design. Crowding-out is thus 
understood as any negative difference in the responses to the motivations survey between 
groups; crowding-in is, in contrast, understood as any positive difference in the 
motivations survey comparing control vs. treatment groups. Hence, any difference on 
motivations between groups (CGs vs TGs) can be attributed to participation in the 
experiment5.  
 
As noted in the Introduction, we develop a post-experiment survey to compare 
participants’ experimental behavior with their survey responses in order to grasp more 
accurately the extent to which payments crowd-in or crowd-out motivations to conserve 
the forest. Experimental behavior reveals participants’ willingness to conserve in 
response to different incentives, but it does not say anything explicit about the kind of 
motivations that have driven such behavior. The latter can, however, be captured through 
the survey. An alternative research design would have been to conduct a survey on 
motivations before and after the experiment (within research design). Two main reasons 
refrained us to do so: first, it is very likely that asking participants to respond to a survey 
on forest protection before participating in the experiment would have influenced their 
behavior in the game towards more conservation behavior. Second, we wanted to avoid 
that participants sought for consistency in their responses before and after the experiment 
(Festinger, 1962). Thus, and given our between group design approach, the recruitment 
strategy was set in order to ensure that individuals were randomly assigned to sessions 
and groups.  
 
Each participant received a written note including the date and hour of her/his session and 
slots were allocated randomly across villages and families. This random allocation to 
groups and sessions allowed us to control for observable and un-observable variables, 
such as pre-existent motivations to protect forests. Eleven game sessions were conducted 
in Spanish with the support of six research assistants. Each session implemented a 
different treatment. Farmers, both men and women older than 18 years, were invited both 
face-to-face by two research assistants and through a local leader. The sessions were 
implemented in a local school of a village that was conveniently located for ensuring 
participants’ attendance. Each round of the experiments and the post-experiment survey 
were delivered in two sessions of 3 hours per day. Between 12 and 28 people participated 
in each session6. Before deploying the experiment and the survey, we introduced the 
project’s aims to targeted participants and obtained their written consent, ensuring they 
                                                 
5 We cannot rule out that CGs participants’ motivations could have changed before and after the game. 
However, this possibility does not undermine our results. If CGs motivations are enhanced (or diminished) 
as a result of the baseline game, all our participants experienced the same baseline and the difference 
between them could only be related to the treatments. If anything, it would be harder for us to find 
significant differences between CGs and TGs, which is not the case. 
6 Total number of participants in the experiment were 260. However, three participants left before 




had understood that participation was voluntary and that they could leave at anytime 
(Annex 1). 
 
3.2.1. The economic experiment 
 
Our experiment is an adapted version of the public goods game with threshold by Narloch 
et al. 2012 and Midler et al. 2015 (hereafter Narloch and Midler). This experiment 
recreates a situation in which the environmental service is provided only if the group 
accomplishes a specific environmental objective (threshold). The threshold aims to 
recreate real-life situations in which the provision of an ecosystem service (water in our 
case) is conditional on collective performance (conservation of the forest). Also, the 
payment to farmers is granted only if the group complies with the threshold. This feature 
captures the objectives of the environmental organization operating in the area, which is 
interested in regional scale impacts rather than programs tailored at individual-farm 
performance. We extended Narloch and Midler design by implementing also a voting for 
the preferred payment and a payment in the form of a crop-price premium (Table 2). Our 
design also differs in its framing and number of rounds. While the mentioned articles 
frame the decision around traditional vs. commercial crop cultivation, our framing relates 
to forest conservation vs. crop cultivation. And while in Narloch and Midler the public 
benefits resulting from reaching the threshold are generic, ours refer specifically to the 
provision of water. In our design, the benefits of water provision (not quality or water 
improvement but quantity) are monetized. We conducted 10 rounds (and two additional 
ones for practice that are not analyzed), while Narloch and Milder implemented 12 
rounds.  
 
At the beginning of each session, the lead author of this paper read the instructions of the 
experiment following the conventional procedure for lab-in-the-field experiments. 
Posters with visuals were used to complement instructions and facilitate participants’ 
comprehension of the experiment (Annex 2). After explaining the instructions, 
participants were randomly assigned to groups of 4 people by picking out a piece of paper 
marked with a letter and a number. Letters identified groups and numbers the participant 
within a given group.  
 
In each round (t), each participant (𝑖) received 4 units of land and had to privately decide 
how to use the land: to conserve forests (f) or plant crops (𝑐). For each land unit with 
forest cover (𝑥𝑓), each participant received $100 pesos (USD 3 cents). For each unit of 
land with planted crops (𝑥𝐶), each participant received $600 (USD 20 cents)
7. If the group 
reached a threshold of units of forest, then a public good (𝑃𝐺𝑖) in the form of water from 
the forest, and equivalent to $200 pesos (USD 6 cents) for each unit of forest in the group, 
was provided to each participant regardless of his/her own level of forest conservation 
                                                 
7 Payoffs were set to cover opportunity cost of participants based on daily wages in the zone which range 
between 20.000-40.000 pesos (6- 12 euros). Earnings in the experiment ranged from 24.000-54.000 (6-16 
euros) for three hours of participation.  
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contribution. Participants are informed about the threshold at the beginning of the 
experiment. In the experiment, economic returns from crops are higher than those from 
forest conservation to recreate the current situation in the region, where economic 
earnings from forests in the form of timber, firewood, medicines or food are lower than 
the market returns farmers can get from selling their agricultural harvest.  
 
The experiment was structured around two stages: the baseline stage (rounds 1-5) and the 
payment stage (rounds 6-10). The difference between the two stages is that in the second 
stage a payment for conservation was introduced. Please note that CGs play all 10 rounds 
without receiving payments. We did not introduce a third stage removing the incentive 
(see Kaczan et al. 2016; Salk et al. 2016) because of methodological challenges related 
to the deployment of the post-experiment motivations survey. Table 2 describes the 
resulting numbers of participants according to different treatments. 
 

























N= 52 52 52 52 20 32 
groups 13 13 13 13 5 8 
 
 
The baseline rounds  
 
During the baseline rounds, participants decided and marked their preferred combination 
supported by a “payoff table” (Annex 3). Subsequently, a researcher added up the total 
units of land covered by forests (the sum of the land units covered by forest from each of 
the 4 participants (∑𝑋𝑓),), and she/he announced whether a threshold (𝜃) of 7 units had 
been reached. If so, and as noted earlier, a public good (𝑃𝐺𝑖) in the form of water from 
the forest, and equivalent to $200 pesos (USD 6 cents) for each unit of conserved forest 
in the group, was provided to each participant regardless of his/her own contribution to 
forest conservation. Therefore, as far as the minimum conservation threshold of 7 units 
was reached, this design allowed free-riding because participants who had not contributed 
to forest conservation could benefit from others’ conservation efforts. Participants’ 
earnings during the baseline rounds depended then on combining their private earnings 
from their own land-use choices –either forest or crops- ( 𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡) and the aggregate 
conservation levels of their group which yielded collective earnings from water provision 
(∑𝑋𝑓). Each participant (𝑖) had thus the following payoff function in the baseline stage: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = {
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 + $200(∑𝑋𝑓)  𝑖𝑓 ∑𝑋𝑓 ≥ 7
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡                                       𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒





For example, if one participant allocated 2 units of land to crops and 2 to conserving 
forests his private earnings were $1.400 ($100x2 + $600x2). If, additionally, the group 
had managed to conserve a total of 7 forest units, the participant gained an additional sum 
of $200 pesos for each unit of forest conserved by the group ($200x7). Total earnings for 
this participant in this round were thus $2.800 pesos (see Annex 3 for payoff table). 
Choosing forest instead of crops represented a direct cost to participants of $500 pesos 
per unit of land ($600-$100) while the provision of the public good was uncertain since 
it depended on the decisions of other group members.  
 
To understand players’ best strategy during the baseline one needed to consider players’ 
expectations about others’ behavior. If player (𝑖) expected that the threshold was not 
going to be met, his best strategy was to allocate zero units of land to forest. If he expected 
the threshold to be reached, the best strategy was to allocate one or two units of lands to 
forest. The social optimum, ie. when the group’s aggregate earnings are maximized, 
resulted from each farmer allocating four units of land to forest. However, the social 
optimum is never a Nash equilibrium because there are always incentives to defect 
(Annex 4). 
 
The payment rounds 
 
During the second stage (rounds 6-10) one of 4 different payments was implemented only 
if the community conserved a minimum of 7 units of forest. In other words, if the forest 
conservation threshold of 7 units was reached, each participant gained the $200 pesos for 
the provision of water, plus an additional monetary payment recreating a payment for 
ecosystem services. Following Midler et al. (2015) we introduced both individual and 
collective payments because these are feasible payment alternatives for the environmental 
organization operating in the area.  
 
Each farmer played one of the 4 different payments after playing the baseline. All four 
payments were framed as if a generic environmental organization (OA, organización 
ambiental in Spanish) aimed to pay for the protection of biodiversity and forest ecosystem 
services (e.g. climate regulation, soil protection and landslides prevention). The private 
payment for conserving the forests was $200 pesos for each unit of forest conserved, and 
only if the group collectively reached the threshold of 7 units of forest conservation. This 
meant that each participant was paid the following amount, according to his/her own 
conservation effort: 
 
 𝜋𝑖𝑡 = {
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 + $200(∑𝑋𝑓) + $200𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓   ∑𝑋𝑓 ≥ 7
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡                                                         𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
    (2) 
 
 
The collective payment consisted of a payment of $50 pesos per unit of land allocated to 
forest conservation by the group, and again only if the group had a minimum of 7 units 
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of conserved forest. Unlike the private payment, in the collective payment each 




$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 + $200(∑𝑋𝑓) + $50(∑𝑓𝑋𝑓)  𝑖𝑓   ∑𝑋𝑓 ≥ 7
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡                                                         𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
     (3) 
 
The crop-price premium payment had not been included in Midler et al. 2015. Each 
participant received $150 pesos for each unit of land allocated to crops only if the group 
allocated at least 7 units of land to forest. This payment aimed to recreate a situation in 
which efforts to preserve the forests were rewarded via a crop-price premium in 
agricultural products. Unlike the individual and collective payment, the crop-price 
premium condition explicitly considers that conservation and economic goals are not 
mutually exclusive, with the payoff function under this payment being as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = {
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 + $200(∑𝑋𝑓) + $150𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡   𝑖𝑓   ∑𝑋𝑓 ≥ 7
$100𝑥𝑓𝑖𝑡 + $600𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡                                                         𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (4) 
 
Finally, in the voting payment, each person voted individually and privately before round 
6 for their preferred payment between three options: no payment, individual or collective. 
The option with more votes was then implemented for the rest of the rounds. If there was 
a tie a coin was thrown. This feature was introduced to simulate a situation in which some 
level of agency, or participation in the design, is allowed. Voting on design features has 
been explored in common pool or public good studies with mixed results  (Cherry & 
Shogren, 2007; Vélez et al., 2012; Wahl et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2000). 
 
Depending on the expectations of others and assuming that individuals are profit 
maximizers, all payments are expected to increase the units of land allocated to forest 
because they expand the set of best strategies compared to the baseline rounds. However, 
under the crop price premium incentives to defect are higher because a payment for 
ecosystem service is provided conditional on the accomplishment of the environmental 
threshold, but final earnings depend on the individual units of land allocated to crops. 
Nash equilibria and best strategies for collective and crop-price premium are the same, 
but different from private payment (following original design). Hence, our experimental 
analysis is conducted comparing baseline vs. payment rounds for each type of payment. 
We did not have a hypothesis of which payment would work better in terms of forest 
conservation, but based on Midler and Narloch findings, we expected that individual 
payments would increase forest conservation levels compared to the no-payment 
condition. Payments decided by voting were also expected to increase forest conservation 






3.2.2. The motivations survey 
 
We used the results of the pilot questionnaire as the basis for the design of the post-
experiment survey. The pilot questionnaire was developed taking into account Ryan and 
Deci’s SDT (2000) and Pelletier et al.’s MTES principles (1998) with six motivation 
categories. Each category included four statements or items, and participants were asked 
to respond from 1 to 4 if they agreed with the provided sentence. Items were anchored to 
deforestation because of its relevance to our study site: perception among inhabitants is 
that forest clearing is the main environmental problem they are actually facing (according 
to survey responses), and Caquetá is also the most deforested department in the country 
(IDEAM,2016).  
 
A factor analysis of the pilot questionnaire results was conducted to determine the 
consistency of motivation categories and reduce the dimensionality of data. As a result, 
the final survey we employed after the economic experiment contained eight motivation 
items that had factor loadings8 above 0.55 as suggested by Hair et al. (2009) and that 
conceptually captured four types of motivations to protect the forests that vary on their 
degree of being internally or externally driven: intrinsic, guilt/regret, social, and extrinsic 
motivations (Table 3). 
 
Purely intrinsic motivations are the most self-directed and do not require the support of 
external institutions or incentives to persist over time (Pelletier et al., 1998). In the context 
of our study, they relate to the inherent pleasure or joy that arises from protecting forests. 
According to SDT we can expect that feelings of autonomy or self-competence might 
trigger intrinsic motivations to protect forests.  
 
Guilt/regret motivations are explained by one’s desire of aligning with the values and 
beliefs held by a group of people, community or society, and they are related to ones’ 
need of self-approval. The feeling of guilt/regret thus acts as an internal motivator to 
perform a particular task, but is externally influenced. In our study, these motivations 
refer to the feelings of guilt/regret that may arise as a result of deforesting, particularly 
when conservation is related to moral or ethical principles (Werff et al., 2013). According 
to SDT theory, guilt/regret could be triggered by moderators such as competence because 
individuals might feel frustrated/satisfied and their self-esteem or self-image might be 
reduced/enhanced.  
 
Social motivations are related to the need of being accepted by others and maintaining 
certain social reputation, and they are thus also influenced by external institutions and 
customary practices. In our study, they refer to people’s fear of being criticized by local 
peers and significant others that may promote socially and environmentally desirable 
behaviors (Kinzig et al., 2013). As for guilt/regret, the need to adhere to the social norm 
                                                 
8 Factor analysis is a statistical method that describes the variability between observed and correlated 




or maintain a certain reputation reflects the fact that social motivations are both internally 
and externally triggered. The moderator of social relatedness- or “the quality of one’s 
relations with others” (Ezzine-de-Blas et al. in this issue) - is expected to activate social 
motivations through reinforcing or reducing image motivation.  
 
Finally, purely extrinsic motivations are those explained by the existence of direct 
incentives (e.g. payments) or penalties (e.g. fines), which exert as direct behavioral 
drivers. In our study, these are represented by payments and fines designed to either 
encourage conservation or discourage deforestation (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Description of the survey motivation items, and the correspondent statements.  
 
Motivation  Description SDT moderators  Survey statements 
Purely intrinsic 
Captures inherent 
interest for forest 





1. “I enjoy when I do not 
clear the forest” 
2. “I see myself as 
someone who does not 
clear the forests” 
Guilt or regret 
Captures motivations 
related to need of self-
approval 
Competence 
1 “I would feel guilty if I 
clear the forests” 
2. “I would regret it if I 
clear the forests” 
Social 
Includes motivations that 
rise from the need of 
social approval or 
reputation 
Social relatedness 
1. “I would be criticized by 
my neighbors if I clear the 
forests” 
2. “Significant others 
would be upset if I clear 
the forests” 
Purely extrinsic - 
Incentives 
Captures motivations 
that emerge exclusively 
from external payments 
Combination of three 
moderators 
“I would take care of 
forests only if I am paid to 
do so” 
Purely extrinsic - 
Penalties 
Captures motivations 
that emerge from fear to 
fines  
Combination of three 
moderators 
“I do not cut down the 
forests because of fear to 
fines that might be 




Our final survey used a four-point Likert scale to capture variations in the motivations to 
protect forests. The scale was symmetric, ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (totally 
agree), and did not have a central point with the aim of forcing respondents to go in one 
direction or another and eliminate the risk of neutral responses (Lozano et al., 2008). 
Socio-demographic information on gender, income, education level and economic 
activities as well as information related to forest management was also collected. The 
post-experiment survey took between 20-40 minutes and we used an open access mobile 
application (KOBO) to input responses offline and make data cleaning and analysis more 
efficient afterwards (Annex 1). Visual supporting material was also used to help 







4.1. Checking for randomization among groups  
 
To compare survey responses between groups we needed first to establish if CGs and 
TGs were indeed comparable. We conducted t-tests for participants’ age and monthly 
income, and chi-squared tests on proportion of men and women, and on levels of 
education. We found no statistically significant differences between CGs and TGs on 
observable socio-demographic characteristics (see Annex 5 for sample details). There 
were some differences across treatments and we controlled for them in the regression 
analysis, but note that our main reference for comparison is CGs vs TGs.   
 
We also conducted a regression analysis of allocations of forest in round 1 and in round 
5 using a Tobit model9. Analysis of round 1 allowed us to capture initial levels of 
conservation and to determine whether groups started off with similar levels and thus 
were comparable. Analysis of round 5 allowed us to establish the dynamics in baseline 
stage across treatments and to check for particular trends that might affect our results. 
Conservation levels in round 1 were higher for participants in the individual payment 
treatment compared to the CGs and lower for the individual payment by voting compared 
to the CGs. In round 5 these initial differences disappeared for the individual payment 
treatment but remained for the individual payment by voting. In the behavioral analysis 
(see below), we used a difference-in-difference model (DiD) to control for such 
differences.  
 
4.2. Motivations under different types of payments – survey results 
 
Although our research design implemented the economic experiment first, followed by 
the motivations survey, we present below the survey results followed by the experimental 
results for analytic and argumentative purposes.  
 
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics  
 
We created an index of intrinsic, guilt/regret and social motivations as the average of the 
two items in each category10. For fines and payments, we did not build an index because 
there is only one item for each category. Figure 2 presents mean values for each type of 
motivation across treatments. Motivations range from 1 to 4 and higher values means 
more motivation of a specific type.  
 
                                                 
9 Regression is not included but available upon request. 
10 Correlation coefficient between the two intrinsic items is 0.2539; between the two guilt/regret items is 
0.3837 and for the social items is 0.5429. All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at 1. 
Correlation coefficient between intrinsic and payment type of motivations is negative (as expected because 
they measure conceptually opposite types of motivations) and statistically significant at 1%.  
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Figure 2. Mean values for different types of motivations. Asterisks mean statistically 
significant differences between CGs and each TGs using a Kruskal-Wallis test (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that higher values were reported for intrinsic and guilt/regret related 
motivations to protect forests across treatments. Social motivations appeared less 
important, and expectations of payments and fines did not seem very relevant. Histograms 
of each type of motivation per treatment show that the distribution of motivations is not 
symmetric (Annex 6). We also compared the motivations of the CGs11 and treatment 
groups using a Kruskal-Wallis test, which compares the medians of an ordinal variable 
between two or more groups when data distribution are not symmetric. In doing so, we 
found statistically significant differences between CGs and TGs.  
 
For example, we found that intrinsic motivations were lower for the crop-price premium 
group (p-value< 0.05) and the individual payment by voting group (p-value<0.05) 
compared to the CGs. We also found that social motivations were higher for the group 
that received the collective payment (p-value<0.05) compared to the CGs. Guilt/regret 
related motivations were lower for the group that received the crop-price premium 
payment (p-value<0.01) compared to the CGs, while extrinsic motivations related to 
payments were higher for the group that received the individual payment (p-value<0.05) 
                                                 
11 We also conducted Kruskal-Wallis test comparing motivations across treatments and found statistically 
significant differences at 10% in intrinsic, guilt and fines motivations between collective payment and crop 
Premium Price; differences at 10% in intrinsic motivations between individual payment and crop Premium 




compared to the CGs. Finally, we also found that extrinsic motivations related to fines 
were higher for the group that received a crop-price premium payment (p-value<0.1) 
compared to the CGs. 
 
After this analysis, we conducted an ordered logistic regression for each type of 
motivation and controlled for socio-demographic variables and self-reported 
deforestation, as well as we included a dummy for each different type of payment to 
capture the effect of the treatment compared to the motivations in the CGs. Our dependent 
variables, each type of motivation, takes values from 1 to 4. The five resulting regressions 
for each motivation category are presented in Table 4 (see Annex 7 for models with 
different specifications to test for consistency in our results). Coefficients represent the 
expected increase in the probabilities of the dependent variable due to an increase in the 
independent variable.  
 
4.2.2. Not all types of payments crowd out motivations 
 
Table 4 column (1) shows that crop-price premium payment has a negative effect on 
intrinsic motivations to protect forests (significant at 5%). Being able to vote on the type 
of payment has also a negative effect on intrinsic motivations. These results suggest a 
crowding-out effect of the crop-price premium payment and the individual payment by 
voting on intrinsic motivations to protect forests. Note, however, that for the case of the 
voting treatment, we need to be cautious on claiming causality since, as explained in the 
following section, these are self-selected groups by definition. Voting treatment is 
assigned randomly across groups, but the decision on the type of payment is not. 
Therefore, group behavior in the first stage of the game might influence the voting 
decision.  
 
Regarding the effect of demographics on intrinsic motivations, no difference is observed 
comparing men and women, or comparing by age groups. However, a higher level of 
education has a positive effect on intrinsic motivations to protect forests. If the participant 
reported to have cut down the forest or sold timber in the past, intrinsic motivations to 
protect forests are more likely to decrease compared to a participant who has never 
deforested or sold timber.  
 
Column (2) shows that guilt/regret related motivations to protect forests are crowded out 
when an incentive in the form of crop-price premium is introduced compared to the CGs 
controlling for the correspondent socio-demographics. Contrary to intrinsic or social 
motivations (read below), guilt/regret motivations seem to be explained only by age, 
where older participants are more likely to report higher motivations related to guilt or 
regret compared to younger ones.  
 
Column (3) suggests that participating in a collective payment (either pre-defined or 
selected by voting) vs CGs increases the likelihood of being sensitive to social 
motivations to protect forests. Note again that in the case of voting treatment we need to 
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recall the self-selection nature of these groups and thus be cautious in interpreting these 
results. However, this result suggests a crowding-in effect of collective payments on 
social motivations to protect the forests. Socio-demographic factors explain to a small 
extent the participants’ social motivations to protect forests: it is observed that older 
participants are more likely to report more social motivations to protect the forests than 
younger ones.  
 
Finally, Table 4 also shows that responses to “I take care of the forests only if I’m paid 
to do so” (column 4) and “I do not cut down the forests because of fear to fines that might 
be imposed by environmental” (column 5) are not affected by the type of payment in the 
experiment (no significant differences). Men were more likely to report external 
payments or fines as the only reason to protect forests compared to women, and some 
level of education (e.g. primary school not finished) and higher levels of formal education 
decreases the probability of reporting payments as the only reason to protect forests, 
compared to participants without formal education. Older and more educated participants 
were less likely to report fines as a reason for forest protection compared to younger and 
not educated participants.  
 
Table 4. Ordered logit regression for each type of motivation controlling for socio-













Individual payment -0.576 -0.424 0.602 -0.668 0.319 
(0.427) (0.393) (0.371) (0.442) (0.424) 
Collective payment -0.372 -0.377 1.021*** -0.349 -0.0720 
(0.445) (0.413) (0.376) (0.427) (0.436) 
Crop-price premium 
payment 
-0.999** -1.019*** 0.558 -0.253 0.492 
(0.412) (0.383) (0.362) (0.404) (0.406) 
Individual by voting -1.229** -0.299 0.328 0.400 0.848 
(0.531) (0.527) (0.468) (0.580) (0.557) 
Collective by voting -0.500 -0.341 0.757* -0.106 0.151 
(0.474) (0.459) (0.418) (0.490) (0.493) 
Sex -0.251 0.0229 -0.273 0.699** 0.612** 
(0.264) (0.249) (0.233) (0.286) (0.271) 
Age 0.00823 0.0231** 0.0276**
* 
-0.00645 -0.0241** 
(0.00982) (0.00949) (0.00877) (0.0109) (0.0101) 
Primary school 
incomplete 
0.668 -0.260 0.162 -1.236** -1.331*** 
(0.466) (0.475) (0.422) (0.497) (0.459) 
Primary school complete 0.305 -0.307 0.306 -0.508 -1.155*** 
(0.412) (0.442) (0.380) (0.420) (0.420) 
High school not finished 0.696 -0.476 0.444 -0.971* -2.488*** 
(0.541) (0.556) (0.481) (0.571) (0.581) 
High school finished -0.00837 -0.221 -0.267 -1.764*** -2.311*** 
(0.500) (0.522) (0.464) (0.606) (0.549) 
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More than high school 
(university, graduate) 
1.482** -0.0199 0.292 -2.079*** -2.570*** 
(0.587) (0.550) (0.492) (0.691) (0.647) 
Has cut down the forest? -1.230*** -0.501* -0.399 0.239 0.242 
(0.277) (0.272) (0.252) (0.298) (0.284) 
Want children to become 
farmers? 
0.261 0.144 -0.595** -0.0429 0.418 
(0.290) (0.281) (0.268) (0.323) (0.310) 
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 
Standard errors in brackets:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.3. Behavior under different types of payments - experimental results 
 
Figure 3 describes the average units of land allocated to forest and the success rate by 
payment, comparing stage 1 with stage 2. This comparison reflects conservation levels 
within groups and it allows us to infer if the payment was effective under a particular type 
of payment. Conservation levels are high enough across treatments in stage 1 (from 1.82 
to 2.42/4) and the success rate, calculated as the percentage of rounds in which the total 
forest in the community is greater than 7 units, is very high for all treatments except for 
individual payment by voting (56%). In the first 5 rounds of the CGs, for example, 90% 
of the rounds were observed to meet the threshold. This behavior might reflect the effect 
that the threshold has on cooperation for conservation as it provides a clear sign of the 
desired behavior and a focal point for coordination. This puts additional challenges for 
payments effectiveness because participants are already conserving forests without any 
external financial incentive (see Annex 8 for success rates across treatments). 
 
For CGs, Figure 3 shows that without any payment to protect forests units of land 
allocated to forest decrease from stage 1 (2.35) to stage 2 (2.19). This difference is not 
statistically significant but gives a first insight of what we can expect when running 
regressions that control for observables. For TGs, we observe a general increase in forest 
units except for crop-price premium. There are statistically significant differences for 
crop-price premium payment (p-value<0.1), collective payment by voting (p-value<0.05) 
and individual payment by voting (p-value< 0.01). However, in the first stage, there are 
differences in the average forest units conserved between individuals who voted for 
individual payment and those who voted for collective payment: the former showed a 
lower average of forest units than the rest, which suggest that they might have been 
influenced by group dynamics during the first stage of the game12.   
                                                 
12 Of the 13 groups that played under the voting treatment, in 4 groups there was a tie between the options 
and it was necessary to throw the coin to decide which treatment was played in the following 5 rounds. 
However, whether the payment was by majority or random does not seem to affect overall results. Of the 
13 groups that played under the voting treatment, in 8 won the collective payment and in 5 the individual 
payment. In the groups in which it won the collective payment, the voting was of 3: 1 in all groups except 
for one group in which there was tie and the coin was thrown. In the 5 groups in which it won the individual 





Figure 3. Average units of forest by type of payment and per stage. Asterisks denote 
differences comparing stage 1 and stage 2 conservation levels per treatment (*** p<0.01, 





Taking advantage of the panel structure of our data, we conducted an individual-level 
analysis over time. Recall each individual made decisions over 10 rounds. Thus, we had 
2570 observations in total. In Table 5 we take the units of land in forest cover as our 
dependent variable and conduct a random effects Tobit model considering participant 
repeated information. We followed the DiD framework, hence we created a payment 
dummy variable for each type of payment (treatment) that takes values of “1” if the 
participant was assigned to the treatment and “0” otherwise. We also included a dummy 
variable for stage of the game which takes values of “0” for rounds 1-5 and “1” for rounds 
6-10. We interacted payment dummy with stage dummy in order to determine the 
differential effect of the second stage on each type of payment. We also included as 
independent variables the total units of forest in previous rounds to capture the dynamics 
and learning through the experiment, and socio-demographic information13.  
  
                                                 
13 We also conducted additional regression analyses following a random effects Tobit model and an OLS 
model with dummy variables for different types of payment including a dummy for the control group, a 
dummy for number of round to capture trends that might be affecting the behaviour in the game and socio-
demographic information. Results drawn from this analysis confirm our findings using the DiD framework 
and are available upon request.  
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Table 5. Random effects Tobit analysis for units of land covered by forest using the 
DiD framework. 
 




Individual payment (rounds 1 to 5) -0.0476  (0.270) 
Collective payment (rounds 1 to 5) -0.0625 (0.272) 
Individual payment by voting (rounds 1 to 5) -0.767** (0.366) 
Collective payment by voting (rounds 1 to 5) -0.202 (0.311) 
Crop-price Premium payment (rounds 1 to 5) 0.00201 (0.268) 
Stage  -0.148 (0.128) 












Crop- Price_premium*Stage -0.168 
 
(0.180) 
Total of forest in previous round 0.0408*** (0.0147) 
Sex -0.138 (0.160) 
Age 0.00399 (0.00598) 
Primary school incomplete 0.220 (0.265) 
Primary school complete 0.516* (0.292) 
Highschool not finished 0.137 (0.337) 
Highschool finished 0.163 (0.325) 
More than highschool (university, graduate) -0.328 (0.339) 
Has cut down the forest? 0.107 (0.174) 
Want children to become farmers? 0.0166 (0.182) 
Constant (Control rounds 1 to 5) 1.750*** (0.220) 
Observations 2,313  
Number of id 257  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 shows that the coefficient for all types of payments in rounds 1 to 5, except for 
the individual payment by voting are, as expected, not statistically significant compared 
to the CGs in rounds 1 to 5. This means that treatment groups are comparable and no 
particular group characteristics are affecting conservation levels. However, as noted, 
participants on the “individual payment by voting” group display less environmental 
preferences compared to the CGs. Although we acknowledge that individual payment and 
collective payment by voting are self-selected groups, we report results separately for the 
two groups because these differences are still informative. Coefficient for variable stage, 
capturing rounds 6-10 for the CGs, is negative but not statistically significant.  
 
As for the interactions, capturing the effect of rounds 6-10 for each type of payment, all 
(except for crop price-premium) are positive and statistically significant at 1%. This 
means that all types of payments increase forest conservation levels when the payment is 
introduced (round 6-10). The interaction term is not significant for the crop price-
premium, suggesting that there are no differences in conservation levels comparing stage 
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“0” and stage “1” of the game for this group. Although comparing treatments directly is 
not entirely correct due to the self-selection bias of the voting treatment, we conducted a 
post estimation test to compare coefficients. We observe that individual payment by 
voting is the most effective compared to individual (p-value< 0.05), collective payments 
(p-value<0.01) and collective by voting (p-value< 0.1). No other differences are 
observed. However, these results should be taken with caution because, as mentioned 
earlier, individuals who voted for the individual payment were choosing more crops than 
forest in the first stage compared to other treatment groups.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper set out to investigate the relationship between motivational crowding, types 
of motivations, and the specific features of a simulated PES scheme to be implemented 
in the study area. In doing so, we implemented a framed field experiment and a post-
experiment motivations survey, involving 257 rural dwellers of the Colombian Amazon 
Piedmont. In summary, our findings show that all types of PES, except for the crop-price 
premium payment, increased conservation behavior in the experiment; but not all types 
of payments affected motivations equally: collective payments enhanced social 
motivations to protect forests, the crop-price premium reduced intrinsic and guilt/regret 
related motivations, while voting reduced intrinsic motivations for the case of individual 
payment and enhanced social motivations for those who voted for the collective type of 
payment (Table 6).  
 












Premium price payment 
Crowd out 
intrinsic and guilt/regret 
motivations 
n/e 









The fact that collective payments fostered social motivations to protect forests might be 
because participants probably perceived such payments as a means to promote a 
cooperative culture (Gagné & Forest, 2008), which led them to consider others’ opinions 
regarding forest conservation more centrally in their individual reasoning. Collective 
payments might have activated the psychological mechanism of social belongingness and 
connectedness to a group (social relatedness). Consequently, we expected that the 
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possibility of voting would have increased participants’ sense of autonomy for those 
voting for collective payments and thus would have translated into higher social 
motivations to conserve, particularly compared to those who received a collective 
payment but did not have a choice. However, we found that both the pre-defined and 
voted collective payment crowded-in social motivations. 
 
When discussing with participants their preferred type of payment after the experiment 
and the survey were conducted, no consensus was reached and more disadvantages than 
opportunities were mentioned for the collective payment compared to the individual. 
Community leaders thought collective payments could help coordinating pro-
environmental collective action across the district, while other community members 
preferred individual payments, as the latter depended on “one’s responsibility” and 
reflected “one’s willingness to care about the forest”. Our results on collective payments 
are consistent with findings of motivational crowding-in when collective benefits are 
realized (Agrawal et al., 2015) but contradict those of Narloch et al. (2012) and Midler et 
al. (2015), who found that collective payments crowd-out social norms for conservation. 
This contradicting result might be explained by the social and institutional context where 
the experiment was implemented, or by the fact that Narloch and Midler measure 
motivational crowding through an experiment alone. 
 
Another finding of our research is that individual payments selected by voting reduced 
intrinsic motivations to protect forests, which consistently align with those who argue that 
individual payments, regardless of whether they have been selected or not over other 
payment options, are likely to erode intrinsic motivations and reinforce extrinsic ones 
(Chervier et al., 2017; Frey, 1994). This result, however, should be treated with caution 
since some form of reverse causality may have been operating when conducting the 
voting: choosing the individual payment was probably the result of participants’ low level 
of intrinsic environmental motivations and not vice versa.  
 
Finally, crop-price premium payments reduced intrinsic and guilt/regret related 
motivations, probably because this type of payment conveyed a message that released 
participants from a moral responsibility to conserve forests and, simultaneously, 
reinforced positive attitudes about crop production. This type of payment is different from 
individual and collective PES because it pays for allocating land to crops and not to forest 
conservation. Hence, while the “desired behavior” in the context of paying for forest 
conservation was clear, the crop-price payment made such desirable behavior less 
evident. In a participant’s own words, “under this type of payment, it is easy to forget the 
initial environmental objective [of the payment]”. Also, it is no surprise that our results 
showed no effect of the crop-price premium on social motivations because the 
cooperative framework mentioned above is not activated under this treatment.  
 
In conclusion, how do our results inform the future implementation of PES in El Caraño 
and beyond? In contrast with other studies (Midler et al., 2015; Narloch et al., 2012), we 
think that collective PES can reinforce social motivations and potentially result in 
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increased forest protection. From the implementer’s perspective, such payments are 
suitable when transaction costs of individual payments are high and/or local collective 
action is strong and involves high levels of trust and equitable benefit sharing (Engel, 
2016). In whichever form, and given that PES are far from “neutral” policy tools, their 
design and implementation should be carefully crafted, taking into account and adapting 
over time to existing social-ecological and development pathways, institutional settings, 
cross-scale power dynamics, and participants’ preferences, among others (Berbés-
Blázquez et al., 2016; Rodriguez-de-Francisco & Budds, 2015; Van Hecken et al., 2015). 
 
This article has hopefully also illuminated new areas of enquiry. For example, more 
research is needed to understand how participatory mechanisms -such as voting for the 
type of preferred incentive- affects pro-environmental motivations in experimental and 
real implementation settings. Replicating our methodological approach across distinct 
tenure regimes and social organization settings could help exploring if such regimes affect 
experimental behavior and individual motivations. We could expect that social 
motivations to protect forest are more important in contexts of strong community 
organization than in context of individual land ownership, as observed in many ethnic 
territories around the world (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, 2000).  
 
Investigating the effects of cancelling payments on individuals’ motivations and 
conservation behavior is of theoretical and practical relevance. Policies and programs are 
not commonly funded in perpetuity, and they suffer budgetary and implementation 
adjustments along the way. It would also desirable to develop more research to understand 
how pro-environmental motivations affect real life decisions on forest conservation. 
Quantitatively, this would require including a measure of motivations as an explanatory 
variable of real conservation behavior using, for example, historical satellite images of 
forest cover at farm-level. Additionally, future experimental research would benefit from 
considering the role of self-reported motivations on observed environmental behaviors. 
All these research endeavors together would expand our understanding of the relation 
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Annex 1. KOBO Links to the survey in English and Spanish and Informed Consent 
 
English: https://ee.kobotoolbox.org/x/#YMcY 
Spanish:  https://ee.kobotoolbox.org/x/#YyWl  
 
INFORMED VERBAL CONSENT (translation from Spanish) 
 
Good morning: 
We want to thank you for your participation today. The following activity is a different 
way of participating in a research project to understand how people make decisions. 
You have been invited today because we are interested in understanding the opinions on 
the conservation of natural resources and productive practices in the Corregimiento of El 
Caraño. This activity is part of the project “Conservación y Gobernanza en el piedemonte 
Amazónico” implemented by Patrimonio Natural, a Colombian environmental 
organization, in alliance with the Gobernación del Caquetá. 
First I will explain the purpose of this activity and give you detailed information so that 
you can decide whether you want to participate or not. I ask you to please keep quiet 
while explaining as this helps everyone to listen better. After I explain, you can ask 
questions by raising your hand. 
The objective of this activity is to understand how people decide to use their land. This 
activity may be different from others in which you have participated in the past because 
in this activity you will earn money for every decision you make. You should be 
wondering why do we do this activity with cash? We use cash because we want to recreate 
real-life situations in which the decisions you make have an economic cost for you. 
We have already done this activity with farmers in other parts of Colombia: in the Pacific, 
Antioquia, Huila, Cundinamarca, among others, in order to understand what motivates 
people to do what they do. Funds to finance this activity today come from International 
Cooperation. 
Your earnings depend on the decisions you make and the decisions made by the other 
members of your group. The earnings of this activity are between $ 10,000 and $ 70,000 
and the activity will last 3 hours. 
First of all, it should be made clear that this is neither a government project nor a training 
workshop. It is a research project where we are studying how people make decisions 
about land use. In this way, we’ll learn from your decisions and you will have participated 
in an activity that we hope you find useful and entertaining. 
Your answers will be anonymous and no one will know what decisions you made, or how 
much you earned. Only the researchers will know. This activity does not imply any risk 
to you and you can leave at any time without any justification. However, if you withdraw 
before finishing the activity, we can not pay you what you have earned. 
During the activity we will ask you to follow established rules such as not talking to others 
when not allowed and filling some formats. When the activity is finished we will ask you 
to answer a short survey about your productive practices. We will give a snack and in the 
end each participant will receive their earnings in cash. 
Are there any questions up to here? If you have questions, raise your hand. If you have 
additional questions about this project, you can find detailed information on the sheet that 
we are giving you. 
Please take the time to read the information sheet. If you can not read or did not bring 
your glasses one of us will help you. [Give time for them to read] 
Are we ready to start? If you want to participate please raise your hand. 
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Cultivo $600 0 1 2 3 4
Units of land in 
forest ($100)
4 3 2 1 0
0
 $                400  $                900  $             1.400  $             1.900  $             2.400 
1  $                400  $                900  $             1.400  $             1.900  $             2.400 
2  $                400  $                900  $             1.400  $             1.900  $             2.400 
3  $             1.800  $                900  $             1.400  $             1.900  $             2.400 
4  $             2.000  $             2.450  $             1.400  $             1.900  $             2.400 
5  $             2.200  $             2.650  $             3.100  $             1.900  $             2.400 
6  $             2.400  $             2.850  $             3.300  $             3.750  $             2.400 
7  $             2.600  $             3.050  $             3.500  $             3.950  $             4.400 
8  $             2.800  $             3.250  $             3.700  $             4.150  $             4.600 
9  $             3.000  $             3.450  $             3.900  $             4.350  $             4.800 
10  $             3.200  $             3.650  $             4.100  $             4.550  $             5.000 
11  $             3.400  $             3.850  $             4.300  $             4.750  $             5.200 



































Annex 4. Set of best private strategies of forest conservation and nash equilibria by 
payment. 
 







Set of best private 
strategies 
𝑋𝑓𝑖  ∈  {0,1,2} 𝑋𝑓𝑖  ∈  {0,1,2,3,4} 𝑋𝑓𝑖  ∈  {0,1,2,3} 𝑋𝑓𝑖  ∈  {0,1,2,3} 



























Annex 5 socio-demographic data for control and treatment groups.  
*Monthly income is reported for a subsample because no data was available for the whole sample. 






































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
VARIABLES Intrinsics Intrinsics Intrinsics Intrinsics Intrinsics Guilt/Regret Guilt/Regret Guilt/Regret Guilt/Regret Guilt/Regret Socials Socials Socials Socials Socials
Collective payment -0.206 -0.215 -0.272 -0.304 -0.372 -0.259 -0.274 -0.307 -0.337 -0.377 0.795** 0.780** 0.832** 0.831** 1.021***
(0.414) (0.417) (0.426) (0.438) (0.445) (0.394) (0.400) (0.403) (0.405) (0.413) (0.362) (0.363) (0.367) (0.367) (0.376)
Individual payment -0.339 -0.379 -0.396 -0.529 -0.576 -0.395 -0.327 -0.333 -0.403 -0.424 0.332 0.375 0.453 0.440 0.602
(0.403) (0.407) (0.414) (0.424) (0.427) (0.382) (0.386) (0.387) (0.391) (0.393) (0.349) (0.356) (0.360) (0.361) (0.371)
Premium price payment -0.965** -0.916** -0.891** -0.958** -0.999** -0.921** -0.919** -0.943** -0.999*** -1.019*** 0.310 0.331 0.421 0.409 0.558
(0.391) (0.393) (0.399) (0.410) (0.412) (0.374) (0.375) (0.379) (0.382) (0.383) (0.351) (0.351) (0.355) (0.354) (0.362)
Collective by voting -0.551 -0.557 -0.470 -0.445 -0.500 -0.228 -0.309 -0.294 -0.300 -0.341 0.498 0.412 0.551 0.578 0.757*
(0.442) (0.444) (0.455) (0.469) (0.474) (0.436) (0.441) (0.449) (0.451) (0.459) (0.398) (0.402) (0.409) (0.410) (0.418)
Individual by voting -0.997** -1.045** -1.166** -1.226** -1.229** -0.188 -0.191 -0.211 -0.290 -0.299 0.258 0.200 0.274 0.236 0.328
(0.504) (0.509) (0.522) (0.531) (0.531) (0.513) (0.517) (0.523) (0.526) (0.527) (0.448) (0.456) (0.465) (0.462) (0.468)
Sex -0.437* -0.410 -0.279 -0.251 -0.0551 -0.0320 0.00664 0.0229 -0.253 -0.282 -0.227 -0.273
(0.250) (0.256) (0.262) (0.264) (0.242) (0.245) (0.247) (0.249) (0.226) (0.230) (0.232) (0.233)
Age 0.00605 0.0124 0.0110 0.00823 0.0264*** 0.0248*** 0.0246*** 0.0231** 0.0226*** 0.0216*** 0.0207** 0.0276***
(0.00769) (0.00910) (0.00931) (0.00982) (0.00762) (0.00903) (0.00904) (0.00949) (0.00713) (0.00815) (0.00815) (0.00877)Primary school 
incomplete 0.458 0.675 0.668 -0.364 -0.253 -0.260 0.0223 0.113 0.162
(0.457) (0.466) (0.466) (0.470) (0.474) (0.475) (0.415) (0.420) (0.422)
Primary school complete -0.112 0.272 0.305 -0.437 -0.322 -0.307 0.220 0.324 0.306
(0.396) (0.411) (0.412) (0.436) (0.441) (0.442) (0.371) (0.377) (0.380)
Highschool not finished 0.608 0.742 0.696 -0.469 -0.445 -0.476 0.272 0.336 0.444
(0.532) (0.539) (0.541) (0.553) (0.552) (0.556) (0.477) (0.479) (0.481)
Highschool finished -0.180 -0.00440 -0.00837 -0.293 -0.216 -0.221 -0.345 -0.282 -0.267
(0.495) (0.499) (0.500) (0.519) (0.522) (0.522) (0.460) (0.461) (0.464)
More than highschool 
(university, graduate) 1.152** 1.463** 1.482** -0.110 -0.0261 -0.0199 0.182 0.261 0.292
(0.573) (0.586) (0.587) (0.548) (0.549) (0.550) (0.491) (0.491) (0.492)
Has cut down the forest? -1.208*** -1.230*** -0.489* -0.501* -0.421* -0.399
(0.275) (0.277) (0.271) (0.272) (0.251) (0.252)
Want children to become 
farmers? 0.261 0.144 -0.595**
(0.290) (0.281) (0.268)
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
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Annex 8: Success rate across experimental stages.  
 
 Rate of success stage 1 Rate of success stage 2 
Control group (CG) 90% 83% 
Individual payment 87% 89,4% 
Collective payment 89,1% 89,4% 
Crop-price premium 83,1% 72,3% 
Individual by voting 56% 80% 
Collective by voting 85% 92,5% 
 
 
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)
VARIABLES Payments Payments Payments Payments Payments Fines Fines Fines Fines Fines
Collective payment -0.553 -0.552 -0.371 -0.360 -0.349 -0.125 -0.152 0.0594 0.0554 -0.0720
(0.401) (0.405) (0.418) (0.418) (0.427) (0.404) (0.406) (0.424) (0.425) (0.436)
Individual payment -0.868** -0.741* -0.707 -0.676 -0.668 0.233 0.306 0.374 0.412 0.319
(0.420) (0.426) (0.436) (0.438) (0.442) (0.394) (0.397) (0.414) (0.417) (0.424)
Premium price payment -0.268 -0.313 -0.297 -0.262 -0.253 0.612 0.545 0.556 0.570 0.492
(0.379) (0.385) (0.395) (0.398) (0.404) (0.381) (0.384) (0.400) (0.401) (0.406)
Collective by voting -0.313 -0.350 -0.127 -0.118 -0.106 0.126 0.0839 0.280 0.270 0.151
(0.450) (0.456) (0.480) (0.482) (0.490) (0.459) (0.462) (0.484) (0.485) (0.493)
Individual by voting 0.0672 0.0645 0.348 0.399 0.400 0.660 0.663 0.842 0.873 0.848
(0.553) (0.560) (0.578) (0.580) (0.580) (0.537) (0.542) (0.557) (0.558) (0.557)
Sex 0.754*** 0.736*** 0.703** 0.699** 0.578** 0.585** 0.561** 0.612**
(0.273) (0.281) (0.284) (0.286) (0.254) (0.266) (0.267) (0.271)
Age 0.0110 -0.00748 -0.00696 -0.00645 0.00330 -0.0204** -0.0195** -0.0241**
(0.00823) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.00772) (0.00943) (0.00947) (0.0101)
Primary school incomplete -1.192** -1.239** -1.236** -1.229*** -1.284*** -1.331***
(0.492) (0.496) (0.497) (0.452) (0.457) (0.459)
Primary school complete -0.456 -0.508 -0.508 -1.090*** -1.165*** -1.155***
(0.414) (0.420) (0.420) (0.409) (0.418) (0.420)
Highschool not finished -0.967* -0.981* -0.971* -2.348*** -2.370*** -2.488***
(0.567) (0.567) (0.571) (0.570) (0.571) (0.581)
Highschool finished -1.726*** -1.767*** -1.764*** -2.228*** -2.257*** -2.311***
(0.602) (0.606) (0.606) (0.545) (0.546) (0.549)
More than highschool 
(university, graduate) -2.062*** -2.080*** -2.079*** -2.507*** -2.544*** -2.570***
(0.691) (0.691) (0.691) (0.642) (0.645) (0.647)
Has cut down the forest? 0.236 0.239 0.271 0.242
(0.296) (0.298) (0.282) (0.284)
Want children to become 
farmers? -0.0429 0.418
(0.323) (0.310)
Observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
